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Who could possibly be against "shareholder value?" I cannot imagine many
hands going up. Well, how about "shareholder value-ism" - the notion that
enhancing shareholder value, as measured by near-term stock prices, should be
the signal goal and yardstick for effective board and executive performance?
Professor Lynn Stout, of Cornell Law School, scrutinizes this construct, under
the rubric of "the shareholder value myth" in her eponymous new book.
As Stout's title suggests, you should find this view of corporate purpose
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provocative indeed - notwithstanding that it has been orthodoxy within the
legal and economic establishment for nearly three decades. This essay presents
commentary on Professor Stout's book, situating it in the larger framework of
pre- and post-financial crisis intellectual development in corporate law and
governance.
The Shareholder Value Myth is part of a new wave of more critical, and also
more intelligible, law and economics writing. Perhaps the times are changing?
As if taking a page from her text, in the fall of 2012, Harvard Law School faculty
held a colloquium to discuss whether financial markets and American style
corporate governance arrangements are enabling too much short-termism.
(Under the prevailing "Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis," no such "market
myopia" was considered possible.') The financial tumult of the past five years is
giving rise to a new, more sceptical narrative of political economy - a movement
I've dubbed "The New Candor." Seminal, book-length contributions have
recently issued from Joseph Stiglitz, 2 Paul Krugman, 3 Nouriel Roubini, 4
Raghuran Rajans and Robert Shiller, for example.6
But from the perspective of corporate law and governance, it's Stout's book
that breaks new ground in The New Candor.7 I cannot imagine a clearer, more
accurate summation of the past 30 years' elite thinking about the interrelationship of law, corporate management and finance. Of course, many of us
academics and non-academics - are puzzling over how we got where we are
in the current state of our economy and system of corporate and financial
regulation. So Stout's is an important, clarifying contribution. Moreover, the
book's lithe, hundred or so clearly written pages are the product of 20 years

1 For an early, formative treatment, see Fama (1970).
2 Stiglitz (2010) (presenting a model of the financial crisis and the new balance that must
emerge between markets and governments to effectuate greater welfare and stability in the
world economy).
3 Krugman (2009) (examining the role of capital in recessions and the application of neoKeynesian policies in contemporary political economy).
4 Roubini and Mihm (2011) (presenting a series of bold financial regulatory and market reforms
intended to stave off another financial crisis).
5 Rajan (2011) (taking broad stock of the global financial economy and advocating a set of
reforms necessary to avoid another major financial disaster). Also notable is Amato and
Fantacci (2011) (placing the function of finance in deep historical context and arguing that
the securitization of debt has disrupted the essential balance of debt and credit).
6 Shiller (2012) (arguing that finance can be harnassed and controlled to benefit society
overall).
7 For an extremely powerful, article-length treatment of the psychological, regulatory and
economic effects of the financial crisis, see Mahmud (forthcoming). Professor Mahmud was a
Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2011-2012.
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of meticulous, wide-ranging scholarship. Among other subjects, Stout's academic writing has engaged the relative efficiency of markets, the science of
human motivation and choice,8 contentions about the link between governance
devices and stock price movements, and theories of firms and boards.' Hence
Stout's views on efficiency, investor behaviour, and market response, as evident
both in The Shareholder Value Myth, and her scholarly articles, are rigorously
informed.
As she proudly admits, Professor Stout has maintained a career-long collaboration with a professional economist, Margaret Blair. (Notably, the pair's
seminal writing on theories of firms and boards is mentioned in the Citizens
United dissenting opinion.' 0 ) For this and other reasons, she occupies a unique
position in her field. Though close enough to the intellectual epicentre of
corporate law to read the runes, she's been too independent-minded to quiet
her reasonable doubts." Perhaps most importantly, The Shareholder Value Myth
provides insight into the conceptual mind's eye of the corporate actors who
brought on the denouement of the frothy, millennial financial economy. In
essence, the book's central question is: "What were they thinking - or not
thinking?"
Prior to digging into that seminal question, it's worth pausing to give kudos
to Stout for stepping outside the academic lexicon and writing a book that
allows readers to see where corporate managers and their financial and legal
advisors have been, analytically, these past several years. Stout's speaking so
plainly - without the hedges of equations, formalistic authorities and extensive
footnotes - is an uncommon form of intellectual risk-taking in the corporate
governance field. Given the high intensity of critique that circulates within the
academy, most rational professorial choosers have avoided the possibility of

8 Stout (2010a) (arguing in favour of the normative content of law as a tool of socio-economic
regulation and applying the lessons of behavioural finance and sociology to establish positive
legal mechanisms to spur welfare-enhancing transacting).
9 See, e.g. Blair and Stout (1999), recently cited by Michigan Law Review as one of the top-ten
most frequently cited corporate law review articles of all time. Stout's publications are enumerated on her curriculum vitae, which is accessible from her webpage at http://ww3.lawschool.
cornell.edu/faculty/faculty-cvs/Stout.pdf
10 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 550 U.S. -, -; 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 (2010), at
footnote 72.
11 As they have often more commonly found their voice outside of the established academic
hierarchy, women corporate law scholars frequently have authored more innovative, if less
openly celebrated, corporate law scholarship. See, e.g. Dallas (2012); Dickerson (2011); O'Connor
(2006).
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even more public scrutiny, potential condemnation and possible intellectual
isolation. 12
As Americans we often fail to prize public intellectuals, and yet we forfeit
them at our peril. The insulating effect of social scientific and legal jargon
absent from The Shareholder Value Myth - is one reason why it can be hard to
distinguish between valuable and craven or simply erroneous academic scholarship. In the pursuit of expertise, scholarly fields often become sequestered
both from each other and the public's understanding. Consequently, too often
it's easy to undervalue good scholarship, including discounting its relevance to
both policy reform and excellent teaching.'
Even more incisively, the absence of more popularized, intelligible academic
writing in the field of law and economics and finance surely played some role in
the financial crisis: it made it easier for almost everyone to avoid discussing the
most frightening, fundamental questions aloud, e.g. the potential for systemic
illiquidity and insolvency, and flawed risk assumptions. Furthermore, to the
extent that quantitative economics and finance did inform policy and corporate
governance in this period, their conclusions, and the propriety of their assumptions, were not self-evidently obvious. As is always true, the "objective science"
- and its reception - existed within and reflected a matrix of larger normative/
narrative beliefs. At present we academics commonly refer to this matrix of
beliefs as "market neo-liberalism" - an unfortunate nomenclature, because it
obtains further opacity as it glances off the many strands of contemporary
political liberalism. In any event, Stout eschews discussion of this more
ambitious and contentious macro-intellectual history.' 4
Instead, The Shareholder Value Myth opens with a brief intellectual history
of academic corporate governance. This historical discussion reminds us that
there was hardly any "there, there" in the academic study of law's nexus to
corporate management prior to the mid-1980s. The fact isn't much contested,
but it is largely overlooked. Most contemporary corporate governance writing
has been ahistorical in nature, which obscures the belated, indeed tentative

12 An exception is Harvard Professor Lucian Bebchuk who is clearly at ease in the media
spotlight, as evidenced by his Shareholder Rights Project, of which he is Director. According to
its website: "The Shareholder Rights Project (SRP) is a clinical program at Harvard Law School.
The SRP works on behalf of public pension funds and charitable organizations seeking to
improve corporate governance at publicly traded companies in which they are shareowners,
as well as on research and policy projects related to corporate governance." Http://srp.law.
harvard.edu
13 In this vein, Stout's book would make an excellent contribution to both business and law
schools' courses on corporate law and governance.
14 On this score, a superb job is done by Crouch (2011).
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nature of the field.' 5 Instead of history, or even the law itself, from the mid-80s
onwards, as Stout discusses, corporate law professors largely trained their
sights on the fields of academic finance and micro-economics to construct new
theories of the appropriate relationship between law, markets and corporate
governance. As they did so, they hewed to the lodestar of increasing "corporate
efficiency," and thereby "shareholder value."
Hence what began as abstract, intellectual history, in The Shareholder Value
Myth, becomes incipient interest group theory. After all, ideas do not cohere into
new laws, or effectuate the repeal of old ones, via disembodied, "intellectual"
forces. The cast of interested and interesting characters is expansive: lawyers and
law professors, corporate boards and executives, bankers and other consultants,
as well as politicians. Stout doesn't often enumerate them by name, but we can
see the play of roles and institutions. What becomes clear is that amidst the
prevailing laissez faire policy environment that followed the Cold War's end,
those advocating that everyone would benefit from maximizing share prices
stood to do well.
The profit potential was enormous, potentially blinding. Investment bankers
made huge profits through mergers and recapitalization transactions aimed at
"unlocking" shareholder value. Lawyers were crucial in negotiating, structuring
and documenting these corporate deals, and advising companies in reducing the
"burdens" of regulation. Sell-side shareholders routinely fared well in mergers
and acquisitions transactions, while buy-side shareholders had little recourse.' 6
Chief executive officers and their retinue made princely sums from golden
parachutes and stock options linked to near-term stock prices. Accountants
bent the rules of financial reporting, while their cohort, crafting sophistic tax
avoidance schemes, garnered lucrative consulting fees. "Independent" directors,
were compensated with stock options, while retaining their status as unbiased,
disinterested overseers of good corporate governance. Moreover, in a darker,
more specialized corner of the marketplace - beyond the gaze of most corporate
academics and even most financial journalists - mortgage brokers, executives of
unconventional, "shadow banking" financial services firms, and traders in
derivatives were having a field day.

15 I have elsewhere discussed how the study of corporate social responsibility is a late-arriving,
academic "orphan;" and the point holds true for the study of modem corporations as a general
matter. Because its study is rightly highly synthetic in nature, the study of modern corporations
and the history of corporate law is ill served by the current structure of academic inquiry. On
this point, see Stevelman (2008/2009).
16 See, e.g. Afsharipour (2012) (summarizing empirical literature questioning the value of
acquisitions to shareholders of acquiring firms).
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All this corporate and financial transacting - in combination with new
information technologies - yielded expanded data sets and new research opportunities for corporate law scholars. The most ambitious of corporate law professors, on their own or with finance or economics professors as co-authors,
penned quantitative studies analysing the relationship between law, regulation,
corporate governance and stock prices. Event studies, cross-sectional analysis
and new applications of game theory, for example, became hot subjects for elite
law school conferences and law review symposium publications. Throughout
the 1990s and 2000s, these academic papers yielded suggestions for new shareholder-value-maximizing governance schemes - a new currency for earning
even more prestigious publication venues, appointments and larger salaries.
That this quantitatively enriched academic sophistication was married to the
promise of enhancing value for shareholders clinched the deal. It created a
scholarly juggernaut - a kind of professional/academic "bubble."
Though overly-zealous, none of this felt intellectually corrupt or even especially
venal at the time. Stout is meticulous in never so insinuating. Indeed, the "manage
for shareholder value/higher stock prices" construct could credibly be embraced as
a no-lose proposition if one accepted three seemingly simple propositions.
First, there was the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH). In its most
benign form, the ECMH stands for the notion that markets are superior to other
forms of prognostication in establishing the present saleable value of commodities and other tradable goods, including shares of stock. Nevertheless, as a
hypothesis, the ECMH presumed the presence of substantial liquidity, transparency as to price and the nature of the goods, the absence of fraud or other
material forms of overreaching, minimal transaction costs and relatively autonomous, rational choosing. The problem was - these presumptions were often
ignored by law reformers and legal commentators. Too often the conclusions of
quantitative models were operationalized, applied to real transacting and policy
making, without due attention to the friction and "slippage" arising in realworld transacting. In real corporate and financial transacting, of course, the
ECMH's near-optimal, mechanistic conditions do not pertain. In legal commentary and the implementation of law and policy reforms, too commonly the
ECMH's caveats assumed the status of boilerplate, academic fine print. This
paved the way for rejecting the problem of disparate shareholder time horizons,
for example - as Stout notes and is discussed further below.
The second intellectual pillar of the shareholder value movement was an
adamantine belief in the sufficiency of contracts and extant regulations (even as
they were being weakened by business lobbying). Written, oral or even implicit
contracts were assumed to be adequate to protect employees, suppliers and
creditors. Federal and state laws and administrative regulations were presumed
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adequately responsive to companies' overreaching against customers, employees, the environment and others. This presumption applied notwithstanding mounting corporate success in insulating corporate contracts - including
labour contracts - from robust, arms' length bargaining, 7 and success, too, in
8
loosening the laws and regulations that limited corporate externalities.
The third intellectual pillar of shareholder value-ism was a disciplined inattention to subjects adjudged beyond corporate law and governance - which
included almost all the subjects that make corporate affairs and their study
dynamic, controversial and challenging. From the perspective of mainstream
corporate law, these out-of-bounds subjects included inequalities of bargaining
power, increasing market volatility, systemic risks unresolved through diversification, widespread biases and conflicts of interest among corporate advisers, the
negative social effects of outsourcing and diminished corporate tax revenues,
vastly increased income inequality, corporate rent-seeking through lobbying and
electioneering, and the capture, potentially, of the judicial branch through
judicial elections.' 9 If the work wasn't about financial markets, takeovers or
promoting corporate profits in the name of shareholders, it was considered by
most mainstream corporate law scholars to be at best marginally important.2 0
Accepting this shareholder value-ist shape of contemporary corporate governance before the Great Recession: what made it so? Early on, Stout's book
debunks the false notion that it is US corporate law that mandates shareholder
supremacy. Stout is entirely, unequivocally correct in this conclusion. Under US
corporate law, corporations are distinct legal entities apart from their shareholders. And boards have distinct, statutory authority (under state corporate
law) to exercise their discretion in the management of corporate affairs.
Shareholder value-ism finds no safe-harbour under either the law of property,
or any other set of legal doctrines, including corporate law. Outside of the

17 See Westerna and Rosenfeld (2011) (documenting the decline in private sector union membership in the last quarter-century up through 2007, and noting its confluence with lower
wages).
18 For an account of how the conservative political movement mobilized right-wing think tanks
and foundations to thwart more socially progressive law and regulatory reforms (including
environmental regulation), see Stefancic and Delgado (1996).
19 The highly organized, pro-business political and judicial lobbying efforts by the US Chamber
of Commerce are now well documented. For data on the Chamber's lobbying expenditures see
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000019798
(revealing total lobbying
expenditures by the Chamber of just short of $100 million for 2012).
20 Nevertheless, certain brave contrarians have persisted. Notable among the early progressive
corporate law scholars are, for example, William W. Bratton, David Millon, Lawrence E. Mitchell
and Marlene O'Connor. See, e.g. Mitchell (1997).

8

-

Faith Stevelman

DE GRUYTER

narrow context of sales of corporate control, US corporate law nowhere mandates that boards or executive officers must - even should - govern corporations
to maximize stock prices or near-term shareholder value.2 ' In sum, it's not
corporate legal doctrine that made shareholder value-ism the prevailing modus
operandi and overarching conceptual structure of US corporate governance.
Indeed, this gap between the doctrinal content of corporate law and the
managerial/professional ideology of shareholder value-ism is one of the latter's
most surprising features. Shareholder value-ism flourished among lawyers, academics and managerial elites who touted the optimality of the laws (especially
Delaware's corporate laws), which stubbornly abjured embracing shareholder
value-ism. Even to the present, Delaware's corporate law is resolutely "promanagerialist" (favouring board discretion) rather than shareholder-valuist. 22
So, if the origin and foundations of shareholder value-ism are not within law,
then where else might its foundations lie? As Stout makes plain, economic or
financial theory fares no better as an explanation. The principal/agent model ill
fits the relationship of shareholders and boards in corporate practice.
Legal academics have always known this, but most simply engaged in an intellectual "work around" that validated shareholder exceptionalism despite, not on
account of, the insights from principal/agent theory.2 3 Contemporary finance
theory has moved well beyond the obsession with agency theory, and (as applied)
rabid shareholder-centrism, but the force behind shareholder value-ism has abated only as a result of the humbling, real-world experience of the financial crisis. 24
Accordingly, as Stout highlights, the performance of stock prices over the
past 25 years, the heyday of shareholder value-ism, does not give rise to a robust
endorsement of shareholder value-ism's effects for most equity investors or for
US economic welfare more broadly 25 _ leaving aside its effect on the very rich.

21 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) and its
progeny. For a commentary, see, e.g. Avi-Yonah and Sivan (2007).
22 Notable in this regard are the Delaware Court of Chancery's and Delaware Supreme Court's
decisions in the litigation surrounding Air Products' unsuccessful hostile tender offer for AirGas.
For an analysis, see, e.g. Davidoff (forthcoming).
23 As Stout's discussion highlights, the seminal work influencing the direction of contemporary
corporate law scholarship in the direction of the agency cost analysis, see Jensen and Meckling
(1976).
24 The roots of this line of inquiry trace back to Coase's (1937) insights about the boundaries of
the firm (corporation) being a function of its success in reducing transaction costs (relative to
market organization). For an excellent reexamination of the tenets of Coase's theory and its
application to notions of corporate efficiency and shareholder value, see Biondi (2011).
25 For an account of why elitist political and economic systems ultimately lead to failed states,
see Acemoglu and Robinson (2012).
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Of course, the statistics regarding stock prices are radically altered by the
"before" and "after" of the current financial crisis. Academic work completed
before or during 2007 reflects a very different view of the synchronicity of stock
price gains, shareholder valuist beliefs and managerial objectives.2 6 (Investor
returns began to take a hit after the technology stock crash of 2000, but the
impact of that "crash" wasn't evident until considerably later.) Certainly once
the market reversals of 2008 to the present are taken into account, the
negative ramifications of shareholder value-ism's effect on shareholder wealth
is powerfully evident.
At present, even the efficient capital market hypothesis is credibly contested
both at an empirical and theoretical level.2 7 Cutting edge work in behavioural
finance supports the effect of feedback loops ("reflexivity"), herd behaviour, and
noise trading - all of which counsel against relying on stock price gains as the
metric of increased shareholder or corporate wealth.2 8 Turning to the behaviour of
individual investors, moreover, the academic yield from evolutionary biology and
neuroscience suggests that humans aren't nearly as socially autonomous or
exclusively self-serving as the micro-economic foundations of shareholder
value-ism suggest.2 9 Stout's book deftly surveys all of this.
But the coup de grace in The Shareholder Value Myth is the shattering of the
monolithic, reified "shareholder" crucial to shareholder value-ism. It really
shouldn't come as a shock, but somehow it does. Once we peer through the
institutional conduits that intermediate modern investing, shareholders are
people. The human beneficiaries of corporate shareholdings, obviously, inhabit
every social role, and even most economic classes, for example.3 0 We presume
that the majority of stock is owned by people who fit our understanding of being
at least relatively wealthy; but the comprehensive embrace of corporate pension
plans is changing even this assumption - as conventional retirement plans fade
away. Furthermore, the returns on corporate stock indirectly affect the financial welfare of the "needy": through financial aid dependent on university
endowments, and non-profits' endowments funding social services, for example.

26 See, e.g. Gordon (2007).
27 For a contribution to the latter, see Biondi, Giannoccolo, and Galam (2012).
28 The teachings of behavioural finance and its relevance to corporate investor behaviour is
now well established. See, e.g. Barberis and Thaler (2005). For an excellent, recent work in this
vein, see, e.g. Beunza and Stark (2011).
29 On the role of trust in enabling market transacting, see Stout (2010b).
30 More work needs to be done on the actual identity of stock beneficiaries - research that is
impeded by the lack of transparency surrounding the ownership of corporate stock. For a
fascinating glimpse into the identity of pension beneficiaries and its relevance to their investing
behaviour, see Brown (2007).
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As is true everywhere else of humans, upon closer scrutiny, shareholders are
highly diverse in their opinions and preferences. Their preferences regarding risk
tolerance, time horizon, liquidity, preferences between appreciation and income,
optimal deference to law, and willingness to exploit externalities in the interest
of corporate profit, all of these are subject to wide differentiation. This means
that there is no singular, definitive metric of shareholder value. Shareholder
value-ism, even on its own terms, is a flawed heuristic - a myth. It doesn't yield
a meaningful, impartial alternative to the hard choices inherent in managing a
business enterprises, or counselling those who do.
If Stout's volume had another hundred pages, I'd want them explore the
relevance of diverse shareholder preferences for the legitimacy of corporate
political spending."' Stout's hammering home of the non-uniformity of shareholder preferences makes the US Supreme Court's 2010 Citizens United decision
even more troublesome.3 2 That decision validated corporations' powers to spend
company funds on political advertising in connection with elections. As a result
of the decision, a torrent of corporate cash poured into the 2012 federal election
cycle; and Citizens United also unleashed corporations to spend company funds
in state judicial elections.
There are two fundamental concerns about corporate political spending. The
first is that it's not at all clear that corporate political spending is, in most
industries, a sound investment for corporations. A recent statistical evaluation
by Harvard Law Professor John Coates suggests that corporate political spending
may even fail the agency cost test.
But corporate political spending is problematic even if it is consistent with
increasing corporate wealth. Most fundamentally, pooled corporate capital subsidizing a "business friendly" politician's election comes at the cost of

31 Corporate political spending received extensive coverage in the run up to the 2012
Presidential election, of course. In the summer and early fall of 2012, The New York Times
published extensive coverage of corporate donations to nonprofits' campaign expenditures,
noting the difficulty in tracking them. See, e.g. McIntire and Confessore (2012).
32 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010) (invalidating, on First
Amendment constitutional grounds, legal limits on formally-campaign-independent election
expenditures by corporations). The fact that, both before and after Citizens United, companies
are not, in many cases, required to make public disclosures of their political expenditures is a
fact I decried in print 15 years ago. Stevelman (1997) (describing the absence of transparency
surrounding corporate funding of politically active nonprofit/social welfare organizations and
around 501(c)(3)/(c)(4) entities, inter alia).
33 For an analysis of the interrelation of Citizens United and the law and practice of judicial
elections, see Liptak (2010).
34 See Coates (forthcoming).
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undermining the disaggregated shareholders' and non-shareholders' political
preferences. Shareholders-as-humans are able to balance the pros and cons of
alternative political and judicial candidates; Perhaps a shareholder is vehemently pro-life, while the "business friendly" candidate is pro-choice, for example. Again, individuals can weigh their competing value commitments in
selecting among candidates. But corporate political expenditures take the
personal beliefs of shareholders (and other constituencies) hostage to the
trope of corporate exigency. The legitimating veneer of a unitary, "shareholder"
political interest, is perhaps the biggest shareholder value-ist myth of all.
Towards the conclusion of The Shareholder Value Myth, Stout corrals
several recommendations for improving corporate governance. We should not
assume that everything that yields an uptick in stock prices is good for the
economy, or for the company, its diverse constituencies, or even all its shareholders. Bankers, lawyers, consultants and academics should refrain from waxing euphoric over every transaction, device and strategy that promises to
increase corporate profits in the name of creating real wealth. To date, no one
has invented a magic wand that obviates the messy, hard work of addressing the
competing imperatives of delivering quality goods and services, compensating
and incentivizing employees (and managers), and rewarding investors. The
shareholder value myth was a fantasy that masked unwelcome but realistic
complexity.
Did corporate managers, bankers, lawyers, other finance professionals and
law professors believe in the magic wand of shareholder value-ism? Did we
sincerely believe in the "win-win," rising-tide-for-all-boats concept? Or was it
just too easy to ignore the distinction between wealth being created and wealth
being redistributed?35 I don't know the answer. And to her credit, Professor
Stout does not suggest there was anything fundamentally disingenuous about
shareholder value-ism.
Rather, Stout concludes, it's time to move on intellectually speaking - time
to generate a new paradigm that adequately reflects the complexity of corporations' and corporate managements' reality. A "board primacy" theorist, Stout
proposes that we need to endorse boards' discretion; to accept that directors
must inevitably balance competing corporate objectives, consistent with the
discretion US corporate law affords them.

35 Too bad law and business students were not exposed to Thorsten Veblen's progressive,
institutional socio-economic work, at the same time they were inculcated into the more the
contextual, ahistorical views of neo-classical economic theorists and their lawyerly cohort. For
the former, see Veblen (1899); for the latter see Easterbrook and Fischel (1991).
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These suggestions are something of a cliff-hanger. Perhaps most trenchantly, boards face a profound structural impediment. We simply haven't
figured out how to reconcile the multitude of functions we assign to boards
with directors' part-time, effectively "outsider" status.3 6 But fair enough - unresolved dilemmas are the inevitable result of writing to reach a large audience.
And this is important work. People are hungering for informed, thoughtful
commentary that might illuminate whether there's any logical connection
between corporate elites' decisions and beliefs and the disaster that has befallen
the economy (as expressed both in the Tea Party and people taking to sleeping
in tents under "Occupy Wall Street" signs). On this score, Stout is cautious. She
exhorts that ideas matter; there is, most certainly, a connection between good,
sound theories and laws and good, sound institutions - including corporations
and markets.
So what are the prospects of new intellectual paradigms for corporate law?
Without doubt, the field of academic corporate law is growing broader - complementing insights drawn from traditional economics with those from sociology, political science, psychology and history. Scholars in law and the social
sciences are committed to building a richer foundation for conceptualizing what
corporations are, and what they do and do not do well.
If this works, we must hope, legal and social science scholarship may
contribute to a more nuanced, more realistic and also more reflective policy
middle ground - one that resists the extremes of lionizing corporations (as the
right traditionally does) and inveighing against them (as the left traditionally
does). The presentations at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Society for the
Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE) were encouraging, although there
37
were too few corporate legal academics in the mix.
In sum: there's nothing wrong with believing in shareholder value - unless
it's the only thing you believe in.

36 In my opinion, the most basic unresolved "technical" problem in corporate governance is
that we keep raising our expectations of what corporate boards should accomplish, while we
condone a framework in which they serve in only a very part time capacity. For early, excellent
treatment of the problem, see Dallas (1992).
37 Several of the most fascinating sessions were devoted to evolving theories of representation
in accounting and valuation systems - a topic that was elevated from narrowly technical
considerations of alternative "treatments" to the most fundamental epistemological problems
of value and comparative schemes of regulation. Many of these sessions were organized by
CNRS Professor Yuri Biondi, an Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Accounting, Economics and Law:
A Convivium. For additional works by Professor Biondi, relevant to this commentary, see
especially, Biondi (2005); and in relation to governance, see Biondi (2009).
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